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Threat Assessment: Do Lone Terrorists Differ from Other Lone
Offenders?
Abstract
This study evaluates the viability of a threat assessment model developed to calculate the
risk of targeted violence as a predictor of violence by potential lone terrorists. There is no
profile, to date, which would assist in the identification of a lone terrorist prior to an attack.
The threat assessment model developed by Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, and Berglund and
described in “Threat Assessment: Defining an approach for evaluating risk of targeted
violence” (1999) poses ten questions about the patterns of thinking and behaviors that may
precipitate an attack of targeted violence.
Three terrorists are studied to assess the model’s value as a predictor of terrorism. It is
assessed for its use within law enforcement, during an investigation of someone brought to
attention as a possible terrorist and for family members or friends who suspect potential
terrorist behavior. Would these questions encourage someone to report a friend to prevent
a possible attack?
This threat assessment model provides a foundation for future research focused on
developing a structured risk assessment for lone terrorists. In its present form, the
questions can assist both citizens and law enforcement personnel in identifying the
patterns of thought and behavior potentially indicative of a lone terrorist.
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Introduction
Terrorists who operate without the support of a terrorist organization, network,
or other individuals can be difficult to detect before an attack.1 Research into
terrorism is predominantly focused on organizations and the concepts of social
psychology that explain the influence of groups on the recruit. Research on lone
offender terrorism has been minimal, seemingly because terrorism is most often
regarded as a collective activity.2 From the perspective of social psychology, it is
relatively easy to understand how a disenfranchised individual can be drawn into
a terrorist group. With a rise in individual attacks since 9/11, it may be important
to research other forms of terrorism.
Although, to date, there is no profile that would predict a terrorist attack by a
lone offender, it may be possible to recognize the behaviors that could lead to an
attack by a lone terrorist by applying the threat assessment approach conceived
of by Fein and Vossekuil and refined by Borum, Fein, Vossekuil and Berglund in
their work “Threat assessment: Defining an approach for evaluating risk of
targeted violence.”3 Their model examines behaviors that may help to identify
lone offender terrorists before they attack. The threat assessment approach
developed by Borum et al. will be evaluated for its effectiveness as a tool to aid in
the identification of lone terrorist offenders. This approach has been applied to
other types of targeted violence in cases of school homicide, domestic violence,
stalking and workplace violence, but has not been considered for the lone
terrorist.4 The behaviors addressed by this tool appear to be as relevant to the
prevention of an attack by a lone terrorist as they are for the perpetrator of other
targeted violence.
Leon Panetta, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), stated in
February 2010, “It’s the lone-wolf strategy that I think we have to pay attention to
as the main threat to this country.”5 Anders Breivik killed seventy-seven people in
Norway when he detonated a car bomb in Oslo and then attacked a youth camp.
In his manifesto he described how “Solo Martyr Cells” are undetectable and that
the cell commander works solo, basing all decisions on fixed fundamental
principles, eliminating the need to ever consult. Breivik advises his reader against

1 Ramon Spaaij, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment,” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, (2010): 854, available at:
https://www.opensource.gov/providers/ebsco/GoToSite/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=6&hid=1
3&sid=db676d04-b927-4b4f-b208-7975acbe1e19%40sessionmgr10.
2 Ibid, 855.
3 Randy Borum, Robert Fein, Bryan Vossekuil and John Berglund, “Threat Assessment: Defining an
Approach for Evaluating Risk of Targeted Violence,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law Volume 17
(1999): 323-337.
4 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, Protective
Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement
Officials, by Robert Fein and Bryan Vossekuil (NIJ/OJP/DOJ Publication No. NCJ 179981 (2000):
iv.
5 Pantucci, Raffaello, A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists
(London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2011): 3,
available at: http://icsr.info/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf.
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making any connection with extremist networks or other movements to minimize
detection, and remain hidden until ready to act.6
The key to a counterterrorism response is to know how attacks are formulated,
and not necessarily who will conduct an attack. Insight into the pathway to
violence might yield a more effective way to defend against the lone offender and
prevent a terrorist attack. Counterterrorism services must be vigilant for the
signals, no matter how small, that an individual displays before an attack.7
This study examines behaviors that may identify lone offender terrorists before
they attack by analyzing the threat assessment model developed by Borum et al.8
The model will be assessed against the case studies of three domestic lone
terrorists. The model will be analyzed for its value to law enforcement
professionals in the assessment of a potential terrorist. The identification of an
individual who poses a threat cannot and should not fall solely within the realm
of law enforcement. Discussion will also include the value of this model for use by
the general public in order to recognize behaviors and thought processes that
might identify the possible lone offender before they engage in terrorist attacks.
Are the behaviors of a terrorist similar enough to those of other types of lone
offenders? Can this model be used to help identify a potential lone terrorist,
encouraging the average citizen to contact law enforcement personnel? Does this
model serve as a basis for an investigation?
Bruce Hoffman’s definition of terrorism will be used as a baseline:
“…the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat
of violence in the pursuit of political change…is specifically designed to have farreaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the
terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider
‘target audience’ Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek
to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to effect political
change on either a local or an international scale.”9

The Lone Terrorist
Spaaij’s definition of a lone offender terrorist consists of three elements: the
terrorist operates alone, does not belong to an organized terrorist group or
network, and the plan is conceived and conducted solely by the individual with no
direct outside guidance or command. The ideology behind a terrorist group and
an individual engaged in terrorism may be the same, a lone offender may
sympathize with the ideology of a terrorist group and may have once belonged to

6 Anders

Breivik, “2083: A European Declaration of Independence,” unitednations.ispnw.org, 2011:
820, available at: http://unitednations.ispnw.org/archives/breivik-manifesto-2011.pdf

7 Edwin Baaker and Beatrice de Graf, “Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism: Some CT Approaches
Addressed,” Perspectives on Terrorism (December 2011), 47, 6, available at:
https://www.opensource.gov/providers/ebsco/GoToSite/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&hid
=12&sid=3b822882-09a2-41f8-9ac0-7ce7d00e7f51%40sessionmgr11.
8 Borum et al., “Threat Assessment,” 323-337.
9 Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 2006), 40-41.
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and/or been trained by a group, but the attack was neither directed nor
supported by any organization.10
A typical terrorist has contact with others of similar interests, often goes abroad
for training, and likely purchases a weapon for the purpose of the attack. While
any of these tasks could raise a flag for security personnel, and signal a potential
terrorist plot, the lone terrorist is unlikely to be involved in any of those activities
11
and would likely go unnoticed until an attack. One of the more difficult
terrorists to detect is one who seeks information online and passively absorbs the
message without interacting on the website.12 The Internet is rife with extremist
material that appears to have fostered the growth of the self-taught extremist. It
may be difficult to distinguish between an individual who simply adopts the
ideology of a terrorist group and the angry loner who acts out using information
obtained from the Internet to pretend to be part of a larger movement.13 Pantucci
suggests there is more mental illness among individual attackers than is found
within a terrorist group. Psychological issues could easily prohibit one from
joining a group, forcing a mentally ill individual to act out alone.14
On the Internet, loners could easily connect with radicals on another continent,
drawing inspiration and guidance, without direct contact. Not only is the Internet
a medium for ideology, it provides information on how to build devices or
otherwise inflict harm in the name of an ideology.15 The lone offender may share
some level of commitment to, and identify with, an extremist movement.16 Those
who can act without leadership or a support network and adhere to the ideology
17
can be very dangerous and would be difficult to locate, track, and monitor. A
major challenge for law enforcement is determining how an individual moves
from having radical beliefs to actually acting on those beliefs.18
Lone attackers are more difficult to monitor because they are not tied to an
organization already under surveillance. They have operated with little expense
and much success.19 Some prominent examples include Theodore Kaczynski and
Eric Rudolph who were both very effective in evading capture for years and
spreading fear among ordinary citizens. They had very strong beliefs and had
separated themselves from family and community.

10 Spaaij,

“The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 856.
“A Typology of Lone Wolves,” 6.
12 Paul Cruikshank and Tim Lister, “The ‘Lone Wolf’ –the Unknowable Face of Terror” CNN.com,
February 8, 2012, available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2012-02-18/opinion/opinion_lone-wolfterror_1_lone-wolf-terror-attack-lone-terrorists?_s=PM:OPINION.
13 Pantucci, “A Typology of Lone Wolves,” 6.
14 Ibid, 5.
15 Ibid, 6-7.
16 Baaker and de Graf, “Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 47.
17 Marie-Helen Maras, “How to Catch a Terrorist: Is Mass Surveillance the Answer?” Journal of
Applied Security Research (2010):26-28, available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19361610903411790
18 Bjelopera, “American Jihadist Terrorism,” 3.
19 George Michael, Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance (Nashville: Vanderbilt
University Press, 2012), 3, available at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/99610155/Lone-Wolf-Terrorand-the-Rise-of-Leaderless-Resistance.
11 Pantucci,
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Counterterrorism and the Lone Offender
Because one cannot predict the nature or the probability of an attack nor the
target, U.S. counterterrorism policy has shifted to a precautionary approach.
Policies designed to deter terrorism are not likely to be entirely effective because
laws that prevent crime, to be effective, require an offender to process the cost of
committing a crime versus the benefit and then make a series of rational
decisions before making a choice. Many terrorists do not appear affected by the
threat of imprisonment or death, as many are willing to die for their cause.20
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the authority to investigate
individuals or groups based upon information that identifies terrorist threats or
activity before an attack occurs. This gives the FBI the opportunity to make
assessments of activity before a crime is committed. An example is the ability to
monitor Internet websites and social media, where terrorists are known to
recruit, train and communicate.21 Undercover agents, informants, and agent
provocateurs who have infiltrated and reported on terrorist activity have been
effective.22
Counterterrorism is challenging because the expression of radical ideas in an
open forum is legal, but the planning toward a terrorist attack is often done in
secret, as the activity is illegal.23 Effective intelligence is required in order to
anticipate and prevent an attack. In the case of an organization where guidance
comes from a leader, information may be gleaned from communication
intercepts, from the monitoring of border crossings and the movement of money,
as well as from relationships with foreign intelligence services. However, this
intelligence is unavailable for the individual terrorist who does not communicate
with nor gain support from an organization.24 As a result, intelligence gathered at
the national level may not be adequate to intercept an individual operating alone.
Local police can gather information from the community through police
networking, conducting investigations or intelligence collection. The sharing of
information between law enforcement agencies is critical to counterterrorism,
and an active police force in a community may be able to develop relationships
with citizens that would encourage reporting.25 Providing guidance for
bystanders who may observe the activity of a potential lone terrorist may enhance
the reporting, thus contributing to counterterrorism.

Threat Assessment
A threat assessment is defined as “…a set of investigative and operational
activities designed to identify, assess, and manage persons who may pose a threat

20

Maras, “How to Catch a Terrorist,” 22-24.
Bjelopera, “American Jihadist Terrorism,” 3.
22 Maras, “How to Catch a Terrorist,” 36.
23 Bjelopera, “American Jihadist Terrorism,” 3-4.
24 Brian Jenkins, “The Terrorism Early Warning Group's Contribution to the Counterterrorism
Intelligence Process,” in J. Sullivan and A. Bauer (eds.), Terrorism Early Warning: 10 Years of
Achievement in Fighting Terrorism and Crime (Los Angeles: Los Angeles County, 2008), 215,
available at: http://file.lacounty.gov/lasd/cms1_144939.pdf .
25 Jenkins, “The Terrorism Early Warning Group's Contribution,” 215-218.
21
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of violence to identifiable targets.”26 It involves the analysis of thoughts and
behavior patterns that result in an attack on a particular target. An assessment
must determine the level of threat posed by the individual at a given point in time
as well as an assessment of the progress made toward an attack and the speed at
which the individual is moving toward the goal.27
Can a threat assessment model for other violent crimes be applied to terrorism?
The prediction of violence is never a simple yes or no; the actions of a potential
perpetrator are conditional, dependent upon numerous conditions or
circumstances.28 The construct of dangerousness or risk has been viewed as fluid;
dangerousness depends upon the situation, it can change, and the level of risk lies
on a continuum of probability.29 Many potential factors must be evaluated in the
development of a model to assess risk. Although the same factors may apply to
terrorism that apply to other types of violence, their significance may be weighted
differently when the model is validated.30 The ten questions developed by Borum
et al. as an approach to evaluate the threat for targeted violence will be assessed
for their value in evaluating the threat for lone offender terrorism.
This approach to assessing the threat of targeted violence is based upon three
principles: 1) targeted violence is the culmination of a process of thinking and
behavior that is deliberate and not impulsive; 2) there is interaction among the
potential attacker, a past emotional event, a current situation, and a target; and
3) understanding the behaviors of the individual as they progress from the
development of the idea to the actual movements toward the target.31 The threat
assessment tool refined by Borum et al. poses questions that address these
principles. It is applied retrospectively here to the cases of three lone offender
terrorists to assess its potential value prior to the terrorist attack.
The results of this analysis indicate this threat assessment tool may be useful in
the development of a more effective counterterrorism program. An effective
counterterrorism program should identify, monitor, and arrest the lone offender.
Included among the keys to an effective counterterrorism program for the lone
terrorist is to understand how attacks are formulated rather than to know who
will attack. Counterterrorism programs should encourage community
cooperation in identifying the lone offender and should study the potential
triggers that radicalize the lone offender.32 This model contributes to this effort.

Threat Assessment Process
Borum et al. posed ten questions to guide an evaluation of a threat of directed
violence. Table 1 presents the questions as they were initially presented in the
Targeted Violence Questions column.33 They are presented beside the questions
26 Borum

et al., “Threat Assessment,” 327.
327-328.
28 U.S. Department of Justice, Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations
(Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1998): 49.
29 Borum et al., “Threat Assessment,” 324.
30 John Monahan, “The Individual Risk Assessment of Terrorism,” Psychology, Public Policy and
Law 18:2 (May 2012): 13-28.
31 Ibid, 329-330.
32 Baaker and de Graf, “Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 47-48.
33 Ibid, 331-334.
27 Ibid,
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posed in this study, under Terrorism Questions, showing the changes that make
them more relevant for terrorism. Two questions, numbers three and four, have
been adjusted slightly for use in the case of a lone terrorist.
Table 1: The Threat Assessment Process: Ten Questions Comparison
of Questions Developed for Targeted Violence and Terrorism
TARGETED VIOLENCE
TERRORISM
#
QUESTIONS
QUESTIONS
What motivated the subject to
make the statements, or take the
action, that caused him/her to
come to attention?
What has the subject
2
communicated to anyone
Communication
concerning his/her intentions?
Has the subject shown an interest
3
in targeted violence, perpetrators
Interest in
of targeted violence, weapons,
Terrorism
extremist groups, or murder?
4
Has the subject engaged in attackAttack-related
related behavior, including any
Behaviors
menacing, harassing, and/or
stalking-type behavior?
1
Motivation

5
Mental Illness

6
Organization

7
Loss
8
Corroboration
9
Concern of
Others
10
Prevention

Does the subject have a history of
mental illness involving command
hallucinations, delusional ideas,
feelings of persecution, etc. with
indications that the subject has
acted on those beliefs?
How organized is the subject? Is
he/she capable of developing and
carrying out a plan?
Has the subject experienced a
recent loss and or loss of status and
has this led to feelings of
desperation and despair?
Corroboration –What is the subject
saying and is it consistent with
his/her actions?
Is there concern among those that
know the subject that he/she might
take action based on inappropriate
ideas?
What factors in the subject’s life
and/or environment might

What motivated the subject to make
the statements, or take the action,
that caused him/her to come to
attention?
What has the subject communicated
to anyone concerning his/her
intentions?
Has the subject shown an interest in
terrorism, terrorist groups, weapons,
extremist groups, or espoused a
radical ideology?
Has the subject engaged in attackrelated behavior, including
surveillance, purchasing weapons or
the ingredients for
explosives/weapons?
Does the subject have a
history of mental illness
involving command
hallucinations, delusional
ideas, feelings of persecution,
etc. with indications that the
subject has acted on those
beliefs?
How organized is the subject?
Is he/she capable of
developing and carrying out a
plan?
Has the subject experienced a
recent loss and or loss of
status and has this led to
feelings of desperation and
despair?
Corroboration –What is the subject
saying and is it consistent with
his/her actions?
Is there concern among those that
know the subject that he/she might
take action based on inappropriate
ideas?
What factors in the subject’s life
and/or environment might
53
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increase/decrease the likelihood of
the subject attempting to attack a
target?

increase/decrease the likelihood of
the subject attempting to attack a
target?

Case Studies
The threat assessment model refined by Borum et al. is applied to the cases of
three lone offender terrorists. The examination of these case studies
demonstrates the similarities in the behaviors of terrorists to the behaviors of
lone offenders who are not deemed to be terrorists. The answers to each of the
ten questions are presented in a table followed by a discussion of the relative
effectiveness of the model. The cases of Theodore Kaczynski, known as the
“Unabomber;” Eric Rudolph; and Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad formerly
known as Carlos Bledsoe have been selected because they are domestic cases and
litigation is complete.
Theodore Kaczynski (The Unabomber)
Theodore Kaczynski, known as the Unabomber, was convicted of mailing sixteen
package and letter bombs, killing three and injuring twenty-three over eighteen
years, and was sentenced to life in prison without parole.34 When he was younger,
Kaczynski’s parents encouraged his academic pursuits, culminating in his
graduation from Harvard University at age twenty.35 He obtained his PhD in
Mathematics from the University of Michigan five years later. After teaching for
two years at Stanford University, and publishing articles that impressed his
peers, he quit, ultimately living as a recluse in Montana.36
Throughout his life, Kaczynski expressed anger toward his parents, blaming them
for emotional abuse because they focused on his academic abilities, thus leaving
him to feel that he was a social cripple.37 Kaczynski wrote letters to newspapers,
magazines, potential targets, and to one victim.38 In 1995, his manifesto was
published by law enforcement with the hope that someone who might have heard
him would be able to identify the Unabomber. In letters to his parents he blamed
them for his social woes, while the manifesto and letters to publications and
public figures spoke of his disdain for advancing technology. Results of a
psychological assessment completed after his arrest diagnosed Kaczynski with
paranoid schizophrenia with two significant delusions. They were his beliefs that
science and technology would destroy nature by turning humans into automatons
controlled by machines and that his inability to socialize, particularly with
women, was the result of abuse by his parents.39

34 Alston

Chase, “Harvard and the Making of the Unabomber,” The Atlantic Monthly 285:6 (2000),
available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/2000/06/chase.htm; Instituut voor
Veiligheids- en Crisismanagement (COT), Lone-wolf terrorism. (2007, June 7): 82-83, available at:
http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Lone-Wolf%20Terrorism.pdf.
35 Chase, “Harvard and the Making of the Unabomber”; COT, Lone-wolf terrorism, 38.
36 COT, Lone-wolf terrorism, 38.
37 Turchie, Terry and Kathleen Puckett, Hunting the American Terrorist: The FBI’s War on
Homegrown Terror, (Palisades, NY: History Publishing Company, 2007), Nook Edition, 199-201.
38 Chase, “Harvard and the Making of the Unabomber.”
39 Ibid; Sally C. Johnson, “Forensic Evaluation,” United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California (1998): 40-41, available at:
http://www.chicagotribune.com/media/acrobat/2008-04/37849352.pdf.
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Kaczynski’s sister-in-law recognized the similarity between the manifesto and
things she had heard about him. She convinced her husband to talk to
authorities. In his report, David Kaczynski stated his brother had become more
disturbed over the years.40 David feared his brother would hurt others and that
compelled him to identify him as a suspect.41
Eric Rudolph
Eric Rudolph was sentenced to multiple life sentences without parole, convicted
of killing two people and of injuring more than 100 people in four separate
bombings.42 He is known primarily for exploding a pipe bomb at the 1996
Summer Olympics in Atlanta. As he was growing up, his mother exposed him to
numerous religions including Christian Identity and introduced him to several
members of white supremacist groups.43 She had also endorsed a fear of the
United States government.44
Rudolph has been described as “disaffected,” a young American who found solace
in extremism. Early on, Rudolph demonstrated his inability to fit in, spending
weekends in the woods alone, living a very transient life with his family, adopting
Christian Identity tenets which includes the belief in the supremacy of the white
45
race, and getting kicked out of the Army after only eighteen months. His mother
likely influenced his anti-abortion stance. They shared many of the same ideas
and his mother likely introduced him to much of his ideology.46
It appears that Rudolph’s inability to fit in and his desire to matter contributed to
47
his bombing campaign. Rudolph’s inability to conform and his failure to find
others who believed as he did appear to have motivated him to attack in anger, to
gain attention through violence that he could not find in other ways.48
Carlos Bledsoe/Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad

40

David Johnston and Janny Scott, “Prisoner of Rage: The Tortured Genius of Theodore
Kaczynski,” The New York Times, May 26, 1996, 12-14, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/26/us/prisoner-of-rage-the-tortured-genius-of-theodorekaczynski.html?ref=davidkaczynski.
41 Ibid, 35.
42 Shaila Dewan, “Olympics Bomber Apologizes and Is Sentenced to Life Terms,” The New York
Times, August 23, 2005, 15-16, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/23/national/23bomber.html?ref=ericrobertrudolph&_r=0;
Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Eric Rudolph Charged in Centennial Olympic Park bombing,”
USDOJ.gov, October 14, 1998, available at:
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/1998/October/477crm.htm.
43Vollers, Maryanne, Lone Wolf: Eric Rudolph: Murder, Myth, and the Pursuit of an American
Outlaw, (New York: HarperCollins eBooks, 2006): 102-104.
44 Nathan Springer, “Identifying the Markers and Warning Signs of Domestic Lone Wolf Terrorists
in our Midst,” (Master Thesis: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 52, available at:
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=29620.
45 Michael Ross, “Eric Rudolph’s Rage was a Long Time Brewin,’” MSNBC.com, April 13, 2005,
available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7398701/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/ericrudolphs-rage-was-long-time-brewing/.
46 Springer, Identifying the Markers, 61.
47 Turchie and Puckett, Hunting the American Terrorist, 260, 270.
48 Vollers, Lone Wolf, 249.
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Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, born Carlos Bledsoe, was arrested on June 1,
2009 after shooting two soldiers outside of the Little Rock Recruiting Station.49
He was convicted after pleading guilty to capital murder, attempted capital
murder, and ten weapons related charges. He was sentenced to life in prison
without parole for the murder plus eleven life sentences plus 150 years for the
remaining charges.50
Bledsoe was raised in Memphis by parents who owned a tour business. Neighbors
described him as a nice young man.51 He graduated high school and attended
Tennessee State University for three semesters before dropping out.52 For many
years he had been in sporadic trouble with the law and was using alcohol and
marijuana to excess.53 While in college, he turned to religion to straighten out his
life. Bledsoe felt welcomed by Muslims and studied in Nashville before changing
54
his name and soon thereafter travelling to Yemen, supposedly to teach English.
Muhammad was arrested and jailed in Yemen possessing false Somali
identification papers.55
Muhammad had stated many times, after returning from Yemen, that he was
angry at what the United States military had done to Muslims in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and his parents were aware of his burning anger.56 After his arrest,
he made clear that he was seeking revenge for the American killing of Muslims.
He also was angry about what Jewish groups had done in Palestine.57 His parents
were aware that he had been radicalized while in Yemen and that he had returned
home with anti-American views and attempted to westernize him by directly
involving him in the family tourism business.58

Responses to the 10 Questions
Table 2 presents abbreviated responses to the questions from Table 1 for each of
the three cases. Most of the questions presented some information that could be
49 Mike Durham, “Arrest Affidavit/Disposition Report,” Arkansas Crime Information Center (June
2, 2009): 4, available at: http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/989.pdf.
50 Jeannie Nuss, “Abdulhakim Muhammad Trial: Shooter in Arkansas Soldier Killing Sentenced to
Life,” The Huffington Post, July 25, 20011, 1, available at:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/25/abdulhakim-muhammad-trial_n_909106.html.
51 NEFA Foundation, “The Little Rock, Arkansas Recruiting Station Shooting,” The NEFA
Foundation, Report #18, 2009, available at:
http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/NEFA_littlerockrecruitingshooting.
pdf.
52 Ibid.
53 Kristina Goetz, “Muslim Who Shot Soldier in Arkansas Says He Wanted to Cause More Death,”
Commercial Appeal, November 13, 2010, available at:
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2010/nov/13/muslim-who-shot-solider-arkansas-says-hewanted-ca/, under section 2.
54 NEFA Foundation, “The Little Rock, Arkansas”; James Dao, “A Muslin Son, a Murder Trial and
Many Questions,” The New York Times, February 16, 2010, 25, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/us/17convert.html?pagewanted=1.
55 Ibid.
56 Arkansas Crime Information Center, Arrest affidavit/Disposition report, 4; NEFA Foundation,
“The Little Rock, Arkansas.”
57 The Investigative Project on Terrorism, “The Making of an American Jihadist: Abdulhakim
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alerting to law enforcement professionals. Family and peers might also utilize
these questions as a foundation for a report to law enforcement officials.
Table 2: Abbreviated responses for each case to the 10 terrorism
questions
Abdulhakim
Theodore
Eric Rudolph
Mujahid
Kaczynski
Muhammad
• Anti-technology • Anti-abortion
• Angry at U.S. for
killing Muslims
• Anti-industry
• Inability to fit
1
in
• Radicalization
• Revenge
Motivation
• Desire to
• Desire to be
matter
recognized; to
matter
• Anonymous
• Told
• No
letters
acquaintance he
communication
wanted to build
of intent with
• Expressed
a bomb
family
2
anger to family
Communication • Maintained
• Maintained
journals
journals
• Limited contact
with family
• Fringes of
• Conversion to
• Hid behind
extremist
Islam
“FC;” Freedom
groups
Club
• Went to Yemen
3
• Hid behind
• Ideology
• Was arrested
Interest in
“Army of God”
against
with paperwork
Terrorism
technology
for Somalia
• Influence: The
• Imprisoned in
Secret Agent by
Yemen
Joseph Conrad
• Threat to “get
• Purchased
• Fights and gang
even” in 1978
materials at
membership in
Wal-Mart
high school
• Science
experiments in
• Gave up
• Purchased
4
high school
connections to
weapons
Attack-related
family and
•
Two
Behaviors
friends
unsuccessful
• Had weapons;
attempts before
learned skills in
shooting
Army
• Paranoid
• No diagnosis
• No diagnosis
Schizophrenia
• No
• Psychological
with delusions
psychological
assessment post
• Diagnosis post
assessment
arrest
5
arrest
Mental Illness
• History of
seeking
counseling; only
single visits or
57
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•
•
6
Organization

•
•

•
•
7
Loss

•
•

letters
PhD by age 23
Professor at
Berkeley
Built his own
cabin
Lived frugally

Social outcast
all his life
Loss of a
peaceful world
due to
technology

Always a loner
Loving letters
versus angry
letters to home

•

•

•
•

•

•
•

8
Corroboration

•

•
•
9
Concern of
Others

Yes: sister-inlaw
Family knew of
anger

•

•

•
10
Prevention

•

Ability to
sustain
personal
connections

•
•

•

Completed
Basic Training
and Air Assault
Learned
survival and
infantry skills
in Army

•

•

•

Few
relationships
with women
Never fit in
Gave up social
connections
prior to
bombing
campaign
People heard
his rants for
years
Anti-gay, blacks
& abortion
Spent much
time alone
Conflict
between
wanting to be
part of a group
and inability to
do so
No, though one
woman heard
threat at least 5
years before 1st
bomb
Community
shared similar
views

•

Finding
acceptance
Ability to
sustain
personal
connections
Mother who
taught socially

•

•

•

•
•

•

•

Attended college
successfully for 3
semesters
History of
alcohol and drug
use
Not a good
planner: 2 failed
attempts
Lost his position
among his
Muslim world
upon deportation
to the U.S.

Angry, but he
was willing to
move to Little
Rock to run the
family business
His attitude
seemed to turn
positive

Yes, the family
FBI questioned
and released
him-no
investigation
His father gave
him a job in
Little Rock to deradicalize him
Had FBI opened
a full
investigation
Had his father
not moved him
to Little Rock
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appropriate
values

Discussion
The threat assessment model developed by Borum et al. to evaluate the
assessment of risk for targeted violence, and presented in Table 1, appears to
focus on relevant patterns of thinking and behaviors when applied to the
potential lone terrorist. Utilizing these three cases, most of the terrorism
questions provided answers, summarized in Table 2, which might have caused
concern from either acquaintances or law enforcement agents had these
questions been available in a structured format. Attention to patterns of
behaviors and thoughts may have prevented these terrorist attacks or, in the
cases of Kaczynski and Rudolph, might have prevented subsequent attacks.
However, their utility is seemingly more relevant with today’s technology and
cultural awareness of terrorism than they may have been in the 1980s and 1990s
when Kaczynski and Rudolph were conducting attacks.
Borum et al. presented three principles upon which an assessment of threat
should be based. The first principle is that targeted violence involves a process of
thinking and planning that is deliberate and not impulsive, often consuming the
planner’s life. Several questions in the assessment deal with the planning an
individual must do in order to carry out an attack. The second principle involves
the interaction among the potential attacker, a past emotional event, a current
situation and a target. The third principle is to understand the behaviors of the
individual that are likely to lead up to an attack.59 Using hindsight, these three
principles are known in each of the three cases presented. These assessment
principles focus attention on behaviors that are likely to be a part of the attack
process. Based on these cases, these principles appear to be as relevant for
detecting the lone terrorist as they are for detecting the perpetrator of targeted
violence. Being physically or emotionally close to someone would expose one to
the behaviors of that person. Publicizing these principles and questions may lead
concerned citizens to contact authorities who may open an investigation and
prevent an attack.
There is significant information known about Kaczynski to provide positive
responses to all ten questions. Rudolph and Muhammad are negative for mental
illness and Muhammad is not known to have communicated any information
about a plan to anyone who might have cooperated with law enforcement.
Question number seven has positive results for all three terrorists. Their histories
are expanded here to draw attention to their losses. Kaczynski was a social
cripple who never fit in. He hated the technological society in which he felt he
could not live and identified himself with a cause that would not reject him: FC,
or Freedom Club, his own anarchist group of which he was the only member.60
Rudolph was unsuccessful in his bid to join the Army’s Special Forces but, by
becoming the Army of God, could vent his anger against abortion and find
acceptance.61 Muhammad fell in with a bad crowd in high school and then in
59 Borum
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college, and sought comfort in religion. Rejecting the Baptist church in which he
had grown up, he learned about Islam and found acceptance in a group that
62
seemingly encouraged him to attack Americans to further their cause. Each had
experienced loss throughout their lives and expressed anger over their perceived
injustices.
The seventh question attempts to identify a recent loss. In all three of these cases
the losses were not recent, but were persistent. The end of a romantic
relationship or the death of a loved one might spark an individual to retaliate out
of hurt or anger. Perhaps with terrorism, loss might be more broadly defined, as
these three cases seem to suggest. Each of these men fought internally with their
inability to find their place in society. Borum et al. appear to correctly identify a
sense of loss as a risk factor for terrorism, but loss as a trigger might be different
for terrorism than for targeted violence. This factor warrants further research.
Perhaps the question should address a festering reaction to a loss rather than a
recent loss that might be more of a trigger for violence against a specific target
than a trigger for terrorism.
All questions in this approach produced positive responses for one or more of
these cases. However, more is known about these cases now than may be
available for potential lone terrorists who have not yet attacked. In the same
manner that the seventh question might be refined, further research is
recommended to consider language that more specifically defines the behaviors
and thinking relevant to the lone terrorist.
Law enforcement agencies may benefit from having these questions; they may
have been helpful in the assessment of risk posed by Muhammad. The FBI
questioned Muhammad before he went to Yemen, while he was imprisoned there,
and then upon his return to Memphis. Muhammad’s father believes his son
attended Jihadi training in Yemen and information about that investigation is not
available to the public.63 It has been hypothesized that had criminal activity been
detected the FBI may have broadened the investigation, which might have led
agents to observe Muhammad in the early stages of the attack cycle.64 The FBI
may have assessed Muhammad for criminal behavior but may not have identified
his behavioral changes over time as indicators of a potential terrorist theat. If
provided a model for assessing the risk of lone terrorism, law enforcement may
examine behaviors more effectively and counter the terrorist threat.
The ability for people to assist law enforcement in identifying potential threat is
dependent upon relationships between the potential terrorist and those who
might be able to detect the potential risk. Kaczynski and Rudolph had inadequate
relationships for most of their lives and Bledsoe/Muhammad turned away from
his family to find acceptance in an unfamiliar culture. In these terrorist cases, the
targets were strangers who represented a cause against which each terrorist
professed his belief. Research suggests lone terrorists tend to be intelligent
individuals who look internally for the authority needed for taking action rather
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than relying on others, and most were unsuccessful in their social lives.65 In spite
of the lack of deep connection, there were people in the lives of each of these
terrorists who could report on changes in behavior and bring their concerns to
authority, as happened in the case of Kaczynski.
Empirical research identifies numerous individual risk factors for other crime
including age, gender, marital status, social class, major mental illness, prior
66
crime, and personality. The FBI was unsuccessful in identifying the Unabomber
when it created a database utilizing these factors. The database included all
individuals known to have lived in areas within which Kaczynski operated.
Kaczynski was eliminated as a suspect because he was much older than the age
bracket the FBI expected would also apply to terrorism.67 Individual risk factors
are unlikely to contribute to the assessment of threat in the way these questions
about behaviors may.
One difficulty with this assessment model appears to be the lack of significant
relationships between a potential lone terrorist and others who could potentially
identify behaviors. Rudolph and Kaczynski were isolated, enabling them to
develop and carry out plans without detection. The person most likely to engage
in lone terrorism is an isolated individual and because of that, planning of the
attack may go undetected. After an attack when information is available to the
public, acquaintances and estranged family may recognize patterns of behavior
consistent with lone terrorists. In cases where the threat assessment model may
not identify behaviors prior to an initial attack, the model may be effective in
preventing subsequent attacks, at a much earlier stage than when Kaczynski’s
sister-in-law became suspicious.
Since 9/11, Americans may have a greater awareness of terrorism. Bystanders
have been encouraged by the Department of Homeland Security to report
suspicious packages. An educational campaign aimed at preventing an
acquaintance from engaging in terrorism may be effective. David Kaczynski’s wife
saw a resemblance between the ideas of her brother-in-law and a terrorist she
read about while in France, causing her to persuade her husband to contact the
authorities after the Unabomber’s manifesto was published. Although difficult,
Kaczynski’s brother hoped to prevent more death and destruction.68

Conclusion
The questions posed by Borum et al. in their threat assessment model, when
modified slightly to reflect behaviors consistent with terrorism, expand efforts to
identify a lone terrorist by focusing on thoughts and behaviors that may be
indicative of terrorist activity. The model moves away from simply looking at
demographics or characteristics of the potential terrorist and focuses on
behaviors that could indicate the movement of the person toward achieving a
goal. This analysis of the threat assessment model developed by Borum et al.
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provides a foundation for further research for a model that would prevent lone
offender terrorism.
Law enforcement is limited in its ability to conduct investigations and identify
every criminal or terrorist in the community. Citizens, law enforcement agents,
and investigators need a tool that might identify the lone terrorist, prospectively
rather than reactively. Identifying a lone terrorist before an attack permits law
enforcement to focus resources on a viable threat.
Further research is recommended to determine the significance of questions on
the list. Not every individual wanting to matter and wanting to fit in turns to
terrorism. By the same token, lone terrorists may not desire to matter or to fit in.
The model provides questions that identify thoughts and patterns of behavior
that could identify a potential terrorist. Are some questions more important than
others in determining the point when one turns from ideas to actions? Are there a
minimum number of questions that might suggest that move? Monahan, a
psychologist who wrote of the challenges to assessing the risk of terrorism,
discussed the concept of structuring a risk assessment. He addressed not only the
need to identify the risk factors related to terrorism, but he questioned the
possibility of measuring or “scoring” those factors to determine their ultimate
69
value in the assessment process. It is recommended the model presented in this
study be further studied, applying questions posed by Monahan’s research. It is
recommended further research apply this model focusing on more current cases,
perhaps having been influenced differently from older trends in terrorism.
This tool appears to provide a solid foundation for a risk assessment model that
may help to identify lone terrorists before and after an attack. The behaviors
described in the questions of this tool appear to be as relevant in the
identification of a potential lone terrorist as they are for the perpetrator of
targeted violence. The strength of this model lies in its focus on behaviors rather
than demographic data. The weakness of the model is that the observations of
behavior require proximity to the perpetrator. Although we may not yet have an
effective tool with which to predict the threat of risk for the potential lone
terrorist, the threat assessment model developed by Borum et al. to evaluate the
risk of targeted violence, with the benefit of further research, can be refined to
more specifically address the threat of the lone terrorist.70
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